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Recent Developments
Sheppard v. State

T

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland
held
in
Sheppard v. State, 344 Md. 143,
685 A.2d 1176 (1996), that ajudge
may not prohibit a driver from
operating a motor vehicle as a
condition of a three-year term of
probation. The ruling by the court
of appeals made clear that,
although judges generally may
exercise broad discretion when
imposing conditions of probation,
a judge cannot prohibit a driver
from operating a motor vehicle as
part of probation, since the
legislature has delegated the authority of licensing drivers to the
Motor Vehicles Administration.
The ruling by the court of appeals
clarified the preemption and
separation of powers issues that
arose when the trial judge overstepped his authority by attempting
to suspend a driver's license as
part of a probation term.
Frances Diana Sheppard
("Sheppard") was convicted of two
counts of driving under the
influence of alcohol for offenses
occurring on August 23, 1994 and
March 6, 1995, pursuant to the
Transportation Article, section 21902(b) of the Annotated Code of
Maryland. Among the conditions
of her probation, the trial judge
prohibited Sheppard from operating a motor vehicle during her
three-year probation term. This
requirement imposed particular
hardships for Sheppard, because
she did not live near public transportation and she wanted to return
to work as a registered nurse.

Trial Judge May Not
Impose A Condition
Of Probation That
Usurps An
Administrative
Agency's Authority
By Douglas May
Prior to this case, Sheppard had
been arrested for driving under the
influence of alcohol in 1982 and
1983.
After being convicted in the
Circuit Court for Worcester
County, Sheppard appealed her
case to the Court of Special
Appeals of Maryland on the single
issue of whether a trial judge may
lawfully prohibit a defendant,
convicted of driving under the
influence, from operating a motor
vehicle for a three-year term of
probation. The Court of Appeals
of Maryland, on its own motion,
issued a writ of certiorari to review
the case.
The court of appeals began its
analysis by acknowledging that
under Maryland law a trial judge
has broad discretion in imposing
conditions of probation, but that
this power is not unlimited.
Sheppard, 344 Md. at 145, 685
A.2d at 1177 (citing MD. ANN.
CODE art. 27, § 639(a)(1996)).
The court noted that other states
were divided as to whether the
vehicle code deprives courts from
suspending a driver's license. Id.
at 146, 685 A.2d at 1177. The

court pointed out that some states
have permitted trial judges to
suspend a driver's license as a
condition of probation when the
legislature has expressly granted
the power to the trial court. Id. at
147,685 A.2d at 1177. According
to the court, the issue in the case at
bar hinged on the preemption and
separation of powers controversy
between the judiciary and a legislature. Id. at 146, 685 A.2d at
1177.
The court began to resolve the
issue by comparing Sheppard with
Towers v. State, 92 Md. App. 183,
607 A.2d 105 (1992), a case in
which a pharmacist was placed on
probation with the condition that
he not work in a pharmacy without
the court's permission, even ifthe
State Board of Pharmacy reinstated his license to 'practice.
Sheppard at 147, 685 A.2d at
1178. In its analysis, the Towers
court stated that "[w]e are dealing
with overlapping circles of authority that are statutorily based, and it
is therefore to the respective
statutes that we must first tum."
Sheppard at 147,685 A.2d at 1178
(quoting Towers, 92 Md. App. at
189-90, 607 A.2d at 108). To
support its position that the legislature had delegated the power to
restore Towers' license to the
Maryland State Pharmacy Board,
the Towers court relied on u.s. v.
Sterber, 846 F.2d 842 (2d Cir.
1988). Sheppard at 148, 685 A.2d
at 1178 (citing Towers v. State, 92
Md: App. at 193-94, 607 A.2d at
110). From Towers, the Sheppard
27.2 U. Bait. L.F. 81
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court concluded that it must first
determine whether the legislature
intended for the courts to be able
to suspend drivers' licenses as part
of probation. Id. at 148, 685 A.2d
at 1178.
In examining the Transportation Article of the Annotated
Code of Maryland, the court
looked at statutes that govern how
long a driver's license may be
suspended when one is convicted
of driving under the influence, and
when a driver's license may be
reinstated. Id. at 149-51, 685 A.2d
1179-80. In the instant case, the
judge's three year suspension was
longer than any suspension term in
the statutes. Id. at 149-50, 685
A.2d 1179 (citing MD. CODE ANN.,
TRANSPORTATION § 16-404(c)(2)
(1996)). The statutes also specify
certain time periods that a driver
must wait before applying for reinstatement of her driver's license,
and in more serious cases the
Motor Vehicle Administration
("MY A") may undertake an investigation of the driver's habits and
abilities before reinstating his
license. Id. at 150-51, 685 A.2d
1179-80 (citing MD. CODE ANN.,
TRANSPORTATION § 16-208(b)
(1996)). Thus, the trial judge's
suspension of Sheppard's driver's
license was contrary to Maryland
law, because the statutes did not
enable the trial judge to suspend a
driver's license for three years and
because the legislature has enacted
specific laws that empower the
MV A to suspend or reinstate a
driver's license. Id. at 151, 685
A.2d 1180.
Finally, the court bolstered its
27.2 U. Bait. L.F. 82

analysis with a number of decisions where the court of special
appeals ruled that the trial court
exceeded its jurisdiction, similar to
the trial judge in the present case.
Id. at 151-53, 685 A.2d at 118081. In Smith v. Smith, the court
held that the trial court could not
prohibit a convicted child abuser
from seeking custody of her children, because the Juvenile Court
had jurisdiction over this matter.
Sheppard at 152, 685 A.2d at 1180
(citing Smith v. Smith, 80 Md.
App. 371, 374, 563 A.2d 1129,
1130 (1989)). Similarly, the court
used In Re David K to explain that
if the trial court suspended a
driver's license, the MVA would
not be able to keep track of who
was licensed to drive. Sheppard at
153,685 A.2d 1181 (citing In Re
David K, 48 Md. App. 714, 72325,429 A.2d 313, 318-19 (1981)).
In the dicta of In Re David K, the
court also noted that the defendant
could enter into a voluntary agreement to surrender his license as
part of his probation, but the
Sheppard court said that this was
not an issue for Sheppard because
she appealed the condition of her
probation. Sheppard at 153-54,
685 A.2d 1181 (citing In Re David
K, 48 Md. App. at 721-22, 429
A.2d at 317).
Sheppard v. State sends a clear
message to trial judges not to suspend the driver's license of a
person convicted of drunk driving
as part of a probation term, unless
authorized by statute. The court
based its ruling on the notion that
a trial judge cannot usurp the
power of the MV A to suspend a

driver's license, even if they are
tempted by the public's demand to
keep drunk drivers off the road.

